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Abstract 
Literature picks up different ways to estimate altruism and altruistic behavior in the context of the 
Public Good Game. The objective of this essay is comparing various methodologies and 
procedures used for evaluating the altruistic behavior. In this dissertation, a questionnaire is carried 
out for contrasting two methodologies used for testing altruistic behavior. The first procedure is 
based on Kurzban and Houser (2005) and the second one, developed from an idea considered in 
Alexander and Fotini (2011). Results present that the second methodology is more permissive than 
the first one. Moreover, results show that gender has not an effect in how altruistic a subject is. 
Behavior of subjects with postgraduate level of studies is less altruistic than behavior of subjects 
with lower level of education. Finally, results show that subjects classified as cooperators often have 
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The objective of this dissertation is comparing various methodologies and procedures 
used for evaluating the altruistic behavior in the context of the Public Good Game. 
Moreover, differences in altruism behavior of various demographic groups are tested. In 
other words, this dissertation aims to investigate altruism in social dilemmas. 
To apply some concepts and theories learned during the degree of Economics is the 
main personal motivation to carry out this dissertation. Moreover, it is a good opportunity 
for investigating some specific topics like altruism, Public Good Games, Game Theory and 
Experimental Economics.  
Zelmer (2003) defines a public good game as a situation where subjects are distributed 
into groups. Each period every subject is endowed with an income and the subject must 
then distribute the endowment between a contribution to a private account that yields a 
constant return to themselves only and a contribution to a public account where 
consumption benefit accrues to all group members. The theoretical prediction of this 
situation is that subject will not invest any part of their endowment to the public account. 
The experimental evidence is contrary to the theoretical prediction. 
The main references that have inspired the present work are Kurzban and Houser 
(2005) experiment and Alexander and Fotini’s (2011) paper. Specifically, the Kurzban and 
Houser’s methodology for measuring altruistic behavior is compared with a method that 
has been developed using Alexander and Fotini’s idea that the personal expenditure 
undertaken by a punisher is useful for bringing out the magnitude of the punisher altruism.  
Both methodologies classify subjects as altruistic or no altruistic. Moreover, a 
questionnaire has been created in order to collect some demographic characteristics of the 
sample: age, level of studies and gender. Both methodologies have been applied to the 
sample and results has been contrasted. 
Results show that both methodologies present similar percentages of subjects 
classified as altruistic. Nevertheless, methodology used by Kurzban and Houser (2005) 




In addition, results show that there are not gender differences in altruistic behavior. 
Moreover, it is found  that the level of studies has an effect in how altruistic a subject is, 
and finally, results reveal that cooperators usually have altruistic motivations. 
The state of the art is presented in the next section and the methodology used is 
described in the third section. In section IV, five hypotheses are commented, and the 
survey design is detailed in the section V. Section VI includes the data analysis and results 
and the final section concludes. Some tests used are included in the appendix A and the 
main screenshots of the survey are contained in the appendix B. 
State of the art 
In this section we review the literature about the experiments of public good game and 
some theories and experiments that try to explain why there is a deviation of the 
theoretical prediction from free-riding, mostly all theories that suggest no-monetary 
reasons. 
Brañas-Garza and Cabrales (2015) define as a basic version of Public Good Game a 
situation characterized by the following factors: subjects are assigned in groups of N 
members. They do not know the other members of the group and they usually can not 
communicate with them. Each member has an initial endowment of T tokens and she must 
allocate her endowment between a private project and a public project, they usually decide 
at the same time. Each token invested in the private project produces M monetary units for 
the subject and 0 for the other members of the group. Each token invested in the public 
project produces V monetary units for all members of the group. The total payoff of the 
subject is M for each token invested by himself in the private project plus V for each token 
invested in the public account, considering his contribution and contributions of other 
members. If V<M, there is a Nash equilibrium, anyone should invest tokens in the public 
project. Nevertheless, subjects usually do not operate following the Nash prediction. 
Since the earliest experiments of estimation of the demand for public goods, a breach 
of the dominant strategy appears, players contribute more than 0% of their endowment in 
the public good. These experimental results are against one of the most accepted ideas, 
the free-riding hypothesis exposed by Hardin (1968). 
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This deviation of the Nash equilibrium has been repeated testing many different 
treatments: one-shot games [Bohm (1972), Ledyard (1995)], repeated games1 [Andreoni 
(1988), Croson (1996), Keser and Frans van Widen (2000)], with communication (Duffy 
and Feltovich, 2000), with heterogeneous endowment (Keser et al., 2014), etc. 
However, there are some studies in which players free-ride, for instance, when all the 
players are students of economics (Marwell and Ames, 1981). 
One of the theories that tries to explain the positive level of contribution of the players is 
that in a repeated context, the subjects learn along the experimental session, they need 
experience. Andreoni (1988) tested the experience hypothesis with a repeated public 
goods game with an unexpected restart. The participants played ten rounds of the game, 
and then the experiment designer told them to play again 10 more rounds. Nevertheless, 
they only played three bonus rounds because they considered enough to test the 
experience. The hypothesis was that if the contribution in the bonus rounds was different 
than in the last rounds before the restart, experience can not explain decay of contribution. 
The result of this experiment is that in the first bonus round the contribution is as higher as 
the first contribution and the third bonus round shows similar contributions as the tenth 
round. The restart affected the behavior, so experience is not the only factor that affects 
the decay. Moreover, we can conclude that experience accelerates the decay in repeated 
games. 
Crosson (1996) repeated the experiment of Andreoni (1988) but with ten extra rounds. 
The restart effect was observed again, the enlarge in mean contribution, at the starting 
point of the second ten rounds. This result confirms that experience is not enough to 
explain the contributions of the players. 
Moreover, Marwell and Ames (1981) realized a one-shot design with experienced 
subjects (experiment 5), they already played in a one-shot public goods game experiment 
before. The results of the experiment were like one-shot experiments with equivalent 
treatment and inexperienced players. 
The absence of free-riding can not be explained by inexperience, results in repeated 
games suggest that there is something else that affects behavior of subjects to contribute 
 
1 Provision decay during the repeated game toward 0; see Andreoni (1988). 
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more than 0, in addition, results in one-shot experiments with experienced subjects are 
similar to experiments with inexperienced subjects. 
Otherwise, Andreoni (1988) tries to test other theory: strategic decisions. The theory 
suggests a positive level of contributions appears when subjects can play strategically, 
namely, they try to coordinate with the other participants of the experiment. To test this 
hypothesis Androeni designs two treatments; in the first one, players are divided in four 
groups of five people and they play and play ten rounds of the public good game with the 
same group, in this treatment named partners, players can play strategically. In the second 
treatment, strangers, groups change every round, so they can not play strategically. If 
subjects in treatments with partners matching contribute more than subjects in random 
matching, it will mean than strategic behavior will explain the overcontribution of the 
players. Results show that strangers give more than partners, so Andreoni rejects the 
strategic decisions theory. 
Nevertheless, Crosson (1996) replicated the partners and strangers design and the 
results were completely opposite. Results show that partners contribute more than 
strangers. Keser and Frans van Widen (2000) considered that the reason controversial 
results may be that experiments are based on a small number of experimental sessions. 
They performed a similar experiment with many more sessions, and they concluded that 
partners contribute more than strangers. 
Strategic behavior can explain a part of the positive level of contributions. Subjects 
contribute more in no-random matching. However, strategic behavior can not explain why 
subjects do not free ride in random matching 
Another theory that tries to explain the behavior of the players is reciprocity. Rabin 
(1993) consider that in addition to their own self-interest, people care about social goals. 
The behavior of people depends on the behavior of their peers, they will be motivated to 
benefit people who helps them, and they will be motivated to hurt those who hurt them. 
To test reciprocity, Kurzban and Houser (2001) use a design from Andreoni (1995) and 
add information about the current contribution level. Participants in half of the groups could 
see the highest contribution to the group and the participants in the rest of the groups 
could see the lowest contribution to the group. They ran a regression of the contributions 
on the value of the information, in order to evaluate reciprocal behavior of players. They 
conclude that there is a significant relationship between the information observed at the 
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end of a round and the contributions of the players. People in voluntary contribution 
mechanism will contribute more when they expect that other participants will contribute. 
Moreover, Kurzban and DeScioli (2008) realize a similar design, but now participants 
could choose the data they consider: lowest contribution, higher contribution or mean of 
contributions. The regression they ran shows similar results than Kurzban and Houser 
mentioned, even when player must pay for the information. 
Literature about reciprocity in the linear public good game shows that subjects will 
contribute if they expect that the other subjects will contribute. Moreover, they will not 
contribute if they foresee that the other players will not contribute. 
On the other hand, there are some explanations that suggest that subjects have 
nonmonetary motivations to walk away from free riding. First, the altruism effect (Ledyard, 
1995) evaluates the additional benefit a subject acquires from increasing the payoff to 
other subjects. And second, the warm-glow effect (Andreoni, 1988) evaluates the 
additional benefit a participant acquires from just the fact of contributing a unit of his 
income. 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) carried an experiment to test the altruism effect and the 
warm-glow effect. They designed an experiment where each participant was in a 4 people 
group and they play four sequences of ten periods. The value of the private good changed 
every period, it was randomly assigned for each subject. The value of the public good, V, 
changed after de second sequence, the first and second sequences had the same value of 
the public good and the last sequences had the same value, but different from the first 
value. They estimated a probit model where the dependent variable was the binary 
investment decision and independent variables were a constant term, the value of the 
public good and the difference between the value of the private good and the value of the 
public good. Palfrey and Prisbrey considered that the altruism effects were present if 
contributions get bigger with the public good value, other factors ceteris paribus. The 
coefficient of the value of the public good was not significantly different from zero, thus 
there was not confirmation for an altruism effect. On the other hand, they considered that 
warm-glow effects appear when contributions increase with a bigger difference between 
the public good value and the private good value, other factors ceteris paribus. The 
coefficient of the difference between the value of the private good and the value of the 
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public good was deeply significant and positive, thereby there is powerful evidence for a 
warm-glow impact bringing about voluntary contribution. 
Regarding altruism, Brandts and Schram (2001) designed an experiment with 10 
successive periods. In each period, twelve subjects were allocated to three groups of four 
people and they answered how to divide their endowment for 10 different scenarios, in 
which the outcome of the public account was placed fixed but the retribution of the private 
account varied, so they extract information for heterogeneous marginal rates of 
information. They ran different treatments, for instance, partners vs strangers, full 
information vs partial information, etc. Furthermore, they designed a test to classify 
subjects as individualist or cooperators. They considered that warm-glow benefits and 
altruistic behavior are independent of other subjects’ behavior, thus if behavior of 
cooperators is influenced by other participants, it will signify that nonmonetary motivations 
are not enough to explain positive contributions. Brandts and Schram use 3 evidences to 
argue interdependence of participants behavior. First, they measure concentration of 
contributions with 2 inequality indices, Theil coefficient and Gini coefficient, they observe 
peculiar Gini and Theil coefficients in the last period of partners matching, so they 
conclude that there is concentration of contributions in specific groups. Second, they 
compare the gains between those that the test had classified as individualist and those 
that the test had classified as cooperators, they observe that cooperators earn more in the 
last period. And finally, they analyze the differences of contributions of individualist and 
cooperators for all possible combinations of treatments effects, they observe that full 
information and the heterogeneous treatment stimulate more contributions in patterns 
matching than in strangers matching, cooperators can find other cooperators in their 
groups. All 3-analysis show that behavior of other participants influences the behavior of 
the subjects. Thus, Brandts and Schram after the analysis suspect that warm glow and 
linear altruism being the entirely variety of other-regarding behavior, this result is the 
opposite conclusion of Palfrey and Prisbrey. 
In this respect, Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) arranged an experiment to test altruism 
in one-shot situations. They considered that an increment in the marginal value of the 
public good has two effects that drives altruism: it reduces the net cost of contribute and 
raises the benefit to others. They designed an experiment with 10 different treatments, 
each treatment was a one-shot public good game and they varied the internal return of the 
public good (Cost of making contribution), the external return of the public good (Increase 
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the benefit of other participants) or the group size. They use standard maximum-likelihood 
techniques to test the relative importance of altruism, they estimate different models and 
then they tested which model fit with the data. A linear altruism model showed the 
importance of the errors of subjects and it measured the altruistic behavior of participants, 
an individual was willing to give up 10 cents to provide 1$ more to someone else. 
However, they ran other estimations, they used warm-glow model of Palfrey and Prisbrey 
(1997) and they measured warm-glow effect with likelihood techniques, then they 
observed that the results fit worse with data. When they combined in the same model 
altruism and warm-glow, results indicated that warm-glow was not significant. So, they 
conclude that a change in the external return and the group size display some altruism. 
Nevertheless, they consider that altruism is not linear, so they ran a Cobb-Douglas model 
of altruism, which it was significant too, moreover, it fit with data better than the linear 
model and fit better with data of other experiments. Later, this model of altruism and this 
maximum likelihood technique have been used to estimate altruism parameter in a few 
more papers, for instance, Laury and Taylor (2008) use this estimation of altruism and 
compare altruistic behavior in a public good game experiment and altruistic behavior in a 
natural occurring public good. Anderson, DiTraglia and Gerlach (2011) use the same 
methodology to realize a comparison of altruism of U.S. and Czech subjects, moreover, 
they show gender differences.  
Subsequently, Kurzban and Houser (2005) carried out an experiment in which 
participants were distributed in groups of 4 people. They played an indeterminate number 
of rounds; game lengths were generated randomly, and it was unknown to subjects. The 
first round consisted of all players at the same time making an allocation to the two typical 
accounts, then, in the next round one player of each group was informed of the current 
aggregate contribution to the group exchange. Suddenly, that player was given the option 
to change his allocation to the two accounts. The game proceeded round by round until 
the game concluded at a point unrevealed to the subjects. They informed every player that 
they would had at least one opportunity to change their contribution. They used a 
statistical-type classification algorithm to classify each subject. Their procedure to label 
was the linear conditional-contribution profile of each subject. Kurzban and Houser 
designated each linear conditional-contribution profile as the outcome of an ordinary least-
squared regression of each subject contribution decisions on the mean contribution that he 
observed immediately before re-allocating his contribution decision. Algorithm classified 
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20% of subjects as free-riders, 13% as cooperators and 63 as reciprocators. Moreover, 
they observed substantial differences in decisions among these 3 types of behavior. 
On the other hand, Alexander and Fotini (2011) consider that altruism can be measured 
in the public good game context including the opportunity to sanction other subjects. The 
sanctions must be costly for the punisher, so, the personal expenditure undertaken by the 
punisher guarantee that penalty are credible and aid to bring out the magnitude of the 
players altruism: the more of her endowment she employ to boost group wide contributors, 
the higher her altruism as delineated and calculated by this procedure. Nonetheless, they 
didn’t realize any analysis in that paper using that methodology.  
Literature picks up different ways to estimate altruism and altruistic behavior. However, 
there is a huge amount of results and some of them are controversial. The following 
section will describe the methodologies used in this dissertation for compare these 
different ways to estimate altruistic behavior. 
Methodology 
In this section, both methodologies used to test altruism are explained. We denominate 
the first procedure as linear conditional-contribution profile methodology and the second 
procedure as personal cost undertaken by the punisher methodology. Moreover, the 
classification of the sample from the questionnaire is commented. 
Regarding of linear conditional-contribution profile methodology, Kurzban and Houser 
(2005) used a linear conditional-contribution profile to classify subjects. They specified a 
linear conditional-contribution profile as the result of an ordinary least-squares regression 
of each subject contribution on the average contribution that they viewed shortly before 
allocating their endowment. They considered subjects as free riders if and only if their 
linear conditional-contribution profile diagram remains everywhere below 25 percent of the 
endowment. On the other hand, they recognized contributors as cooperators if and only if 
their linear conditional-contribution profile graph was over 25 percent during all its path. In 
addition, they classified subjects as reciprocators if the chart of their linear conditional-
contribution profile has a positive slope and spreads both above and below the 50 percent. 
This methodology is replicated for the data of the first treatment. 
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In relation to personal cost undertaken by the punisher methodology, Alexander and 
Fotini (2011) considered that altruistic behavior can be measured with the propensity of 
the subject to spend money punishing with the aim to increase the group contribution for 
the following rounds. They did not postulate a norm to classify subjects. In this analysis, 
we consider this methodology and we classify a subject as an altruist when he spends 
more than 5% of his endowment to impose sanctions. We measure the percentage of 
endowment used to punish each round of the second treatment and we classify subjects 
following this gauge of judgment. 
Moreover, we classify subjects using the questionnaire by gender and by their level of 
education. We allocate subjects as individuals or cooperators, following the questionnaire 
from Brandts and Schram (2001), subjects that evaluate the following statement “In these 
situations, investors should cooperate with the objective of achieve everybody more 
money” with 1 or 2 are considered individualists, those subjects that evaluate the 
statement with 6 or 7 are considered cooperators. Subjects with any other evaluation are 
not classified. 
Hypothesis  
We consider that results from our survey, using procedures and methodologies 
described above, will fit the next hypothesis: 
First hypothesis. Results using linear conditional-contribution profile methodology 
should classify roughly 20% of the sample as free-riders, 17% of the sample as 
cooperators and 63% as reciprocators. 
Our results should be similar as results from Kurzban and Houser (2005) because we 
use the same procedure. 
Second hypothesis. Respect the questionnaire, roughly 23% of the sample is classified 
as individualists, 23% of the sample as cooperators and 54% remain unclassified. 
We replicate the same procedure that Brandts and Schram (2001) in their 
questionnaire, therefore, results of this classification should be similar.  
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Third hypothesis. Subjects classified as altruistic using linear conditional-contribution 
profile methodology should be classified as altruistic using personal cost undertaken by 
the punisher methodology and vice versa. 
Both methodologies measure altruistic behavior, so results between both procedures 
should be correlated. 
Fourth hypothesis. Subjects classified as cooperators using the questionnaire from 
Brandts and Schram (2001) should be classified as altruist by at least one of the 2 
procedures. 
It seems reasonable to consider cooperators as those who want everyone to be 
comfortable, so cooperators should be related with an altruistic behavior. 
Fifth hypothesis. There is not difference between male and female in terms of altruistic 
behavior. 
Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) realized an analysis of altruistic behavior and they did 
not observe difference between male subjects and female subjects, it should be identical 
in the analysis realized in this dissertation. 
Of course, a survey is not the best method for testing this hypothesis. Moreover, the 
subject does not have a monetary incentive answering the survey, so the motivation of 
their responses may not be realistic.  
Survey Design 
In this section, the layout of the survey is described. This survey was made using the 
application Google Forms from Google. The survey consists of 24 questions and it is 
divided in 4 sections.  
The first section of the survey introduces the instructions of the survey and then 
presents the first question. Subject must choose a random number between 0 and 9, both 
included. This choice determines the current aggregate contributions to the group 
exchange in the following questions. In Kurzban and Houser (2005) the current aggregate 
contributions to the group exchange was the summation of the contributions of the other 
subjects so this summation was different for each subject, nevertheless, in a survey there 
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are not other subjects. The objective of this first question is to emulate heterogeneity for 
the current aggregate contributions to the group exchange. 
The second section consists of 6 questions and it is a version of a public good game. 
Subject is informed that he is part of a group with other 3 members and every member of 
the group have an endowment of 50 tokens. In the first question subject must allocate his 
endowment to 2 different accounts:  
-Account individual exchange: for each token invested, the subject earns 10 Tokens 
and the other members of the group earn 0 tokens. 
-Account group exchange: for each token invested, all members of the group earn 5 
Tokens, in addition, subject earn 5 Tokens for each token invested by other members of 
the group. 
Then, subject is informed about the current aggregate contributions to the group 
exchange, this value is determinate by his choice in the first section. The second question 
allows the subject to change his initial allocation with this new information. These 2 
questions are repeated 2 more times. The objective of this section is to generate data for 
an analysis of altruism using the linear conditional-contribution profile methodology. 
The third section consists of 12 questions and it is a version of a public good game 
again. Subject is informed that he is part of a group with other 3 members and every 
member of the group have an endowment of 50 tokens. In the first question subject must 
allocate his endowment to 2 different accounts:  
-Account individual exchange: for each token invested, the subject earns 10 Tokens 
and the other members of the group earn 0 tokens. 
-Account group exchange: for each token invested, all members of the group earn 5 
Tokens, in addition, subject earn 5 Tokens for each token invested by other members of 
the group. 
Then, subject is informed about the current individual contribution to the group 
exchange of each member of the group. The next three questions allow subject to punish 
the other 3 members of the group. The subject can give up a voluntary number of tokens 
and the payoff of the member punished is reduced two times this number of tokens. These 
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4 questions are repeated 2 more times. The objective of this section is to generate data for 
an analysis of altruism using the personal cost undertaken by the punisher methodology. 
The last section consist of 4 questions and it is a post-survey questionnaire. In the first 
question subject must to evaluate the veracity of the next affirmation on a seven-point 
scale “In these situations, investors should cooperate with the objective of achieve 
everybody more money.” That question was mimicked from Brandts and Schram (2001). 
Then the subject asks a question about gender, another about age and the last question is 
about his level of studies. The objective of this section is to generate data for classify 
subjects. 
Appendix B includes the main screenshots of the survey in Spanish. 
Data analysis and Results 
This section is focused on describing the main results of the survey’s data analysis. 
First, the main details of some descriptive statics are outlined, then an analysis of the 
public good game is carried out and, finally, processes submitted in the Methodology 
section to measure the altruistic behavior are applied.     
The survey was answered online, and it was made accessible using Google Forms 
sharing options. In detail, the survey was published on the 14th of April and it was 
available for one week. A total of 78 responses were registered. 
The Sample 
The aim of this section is to descrive the charasteristics of the sample. Sample is 
classificated into three criteria from the socio-demographic questionnarie: age, gender and 
level of studies. 
Figure 1 is a pie chart that shows the percentages of the distribution of the sample by 
gender. The sample consists of 23 women and 55 men. Thus, the number of male 
subjects is vastly greater than that of female subjects. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of the sample by gender 
 
Regarding age distribution. Figure 2 is a frequency distribution of the ages of the 
subjects. Observe that the main part of the sample is between 20 and 29 years old, 
roughly 85% of the sample. Each of the other groups represents less than the 7% of the 
sample 
Figure 2: Distribution of the whole sample by age. 
 
In the chart graphic presented as Figure 3, it is showed the distribution of the sample by 
the level of studies completed. 51% of the sample has attained secondary education, 35% 
of the subjects attained a Baechlor’s degree and 8% of the subjects has postgraduate 
education. Only 6% of the sample leaved studies after mandatory education. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of the sample by level of studies 
 
Public Good Game 
In this section, we carry out an analysis of the Public Good Game. We can consider the 
odd rounds of each game as 6 different one-shot Public Good Games. 
Figure 4 presents the data for average investment in the group exchange for each one-
shot public good game in terms of the percentage of the endowment. It shows that the 
average of the investment in the public account is around to the 55%-60% of the 
endowment. In other words, the subject contributes more than half of his/her endowment 
to the group exchange, on average. 




Players contribute more than 0% of their endowment to the group exchange, for this 
reason, this result is in line with the previous public good game experiments in the 
literature, there is a breach of the dominant strategy, this fact was commented in the 
section “State of the art”. 
Altruism  
In this section, we will comment the results of applying the procedures from the section 
Methodology to the data from the survey. 
Regarding the linear conditional contribution profile methodology, the gauge of 
judgment classifies 43 subjects as Altruist (55% of the sample), 9 subjects as Free-riders 
(12% of the sample), 1 subject as reciprocator (1% of the sample) and 25 subjects remain 
unclassified (32% of the sample). These results are presented in figure 5. 
Figure 5: Classification of the sample using the linear conditional-contribution profile 
methodology. 
 
Results differ greatly from the results from Kurzban and Houser (2005) experiment. For 
this reason, we can reject the first hypothesis. 
Concerning the personal cost undertaken by the punisher methodology, we calculate 
the percentage of the endowment that subjects use for punishing the other subjects. 
Figure 6 is a chart graph that presents the amounts that subjects are willing to give up for 




Figure 6: Willingness of the subjects to give up part of their assets in order to punish. 
 
The gauge of judgment used for this methodology (A subject is altruist when he spends 
more than 10% of his endowment) classifies 50 subjects as altruist and 28 subjects as no 
altruist. In other words, 64% of the sample is willing to spend 10% of their endowment to 
increase the group contribution for the following rounds. Figure 7 presents this statistic. 
Figure 7: Classification of the subjects using the personal cost undertaken based on the 
punisher methodology 
 
Comparing both methodologies, 29 (64.44%) of the subjects classified as altruist by the 
linear conditional-contribution profile methodology are classified as altruist by the personal 
cost undertaken by the punisher methodology. Likewise, 58% of the subjects classified as 
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altruist by the personal cost undertaken by the punisher methodology are also classified as 
altruist by the linear conditional-contribution profile methodology. 
Hence, it seems reasonable not to reject the third hypothesis. Subjects that were 
allocated as altruist by one of the methodologies are probably also allocated as altruist by 
the other methodology. 
On the other hand, the questionnaire from Brandts and Schram (2001) classifies 54 
subjects as cooperators, 1 as individualist and 23 remain unclassified.  




These results are strongly differents from the percentages of the Brandts and Schram 
(2001) experiment. For that reason, we can reject the second hypothesis, results of this 
dissertation are not like the Brandts and Schram (2001) classification. 
Moreover, for testing the fourth hypothesis, we compared the results of the linear 
conditional contribution profile methodology and the personal cost undertaken by the 
punisher methodology for all 54 cooperators. We observed that 83.33% of the cooperators 
are classified as altruist by at least one of both procedures. Fourth hypothesis seems 
acceptable. We can confirm that a cooperator wants everyone to be comfortable and it is 
closely related with altruistic behavior. 
Afterwards, we compare altruistic behavior between genders. The following four figures 
presents the percentages of sample classified as altruist by the personal cost undertaken 
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by the punisher methodology and by the linear conditional contribution profile methodology 
applied for men and women.  
First, we observe that the personal cost undertaken by the punisher methodology 
classifies 60.87% of women and 52.73% of men as altruist.  
Secondly, we note that the linear conditional contribution profile methodology distributes 
73.91% of women and 60% of men as altruist.  
On the other hand, the amounts that subjects give up for punishing can be considered 
as a measurement of altruism. For testing gender differences, we compare these amounts 
between men and women. Samples does not come from a normally population, so we use 
a Mann Whitney U test2. Using this test, we can confirm that there is no difference 
between men and women in the willingness to spend part of their endowment for 
punishing, considering a significance level of 0.05. 
In both methodologies, women have a slightly higher percentage of people altruist than 
men. Nevertheless, results of the Mann Whitney U test in the Appendix A suggest that this 
slightly difference is not statistically significant. Thus, we can not reject the fifth hypothesis, 
we consider that the behavior of women is as altruistic as the behavior of men. 
Figure 9: Classification of women as altruistic or no altruistic using the linear conditional 




2 Tests of Normality and Mann Whitney tests are presented in the appendix A 
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Figure 10: Classification of men as altruistic or no altruistic using the linear conditional 
contribution profile methodology. 
 
Figure 11: Classification of women as altruistic or no altruistic using the personal cost 




Figure 12: Classification of men as altruistic or no altruistic using the personal cost 
undertaken by the punisher methodology. 
 
Furthermore, it is considered the possibility of the level of studies having an effect in 
how altruistic a subject is. Figure 13 presents the percentage of subjects classified as 
altruist for each one level of studies. Percentages of subjects classified as altruist for 
subjects that studied a bachelor’s degree, subjects that studied secondary education and 
subjects that only studied mandatory education are similar, roughly 50%-60% of all 
subjects. However, both methodologies classify as altruist 20% of subjects that studied 
post graduate education.  
Moreover, we compare the amounts that subjects with post graduate education give up 
for punishing with the amounts that the other subjects give up for punishing. We use a 
Mann Whitney U test because distribution of both samples is not normal3. Using Mann 
Whitney U test presented in appendix A, we can confirm that there is difference between 
subjects with post graduate education and subjects with lower level of studies in the 
willingness to spend part of their endowment for punishing, considering a significance level 
of 0.05. 
In other words, altruistic behavior is more common when subject studied less than post 
graduate education. Subjects with the higher level of education presents lower percentage 
of altruistic behavior, they are almost never altruistic.  
 
3 Tests of Normality and Mann Whitney tests are presented in the appendix A 
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Figure 13: Percentage of subjects classified as altruist for each level of studies. 
 
We considered to carry out an analysis of the influence of the age for altruistic behavior, 
nevertheless the chararteristics of the sample are not suitable. Sample is not 
heterogeneous enough for this analysis. 




In this section the main conclusions of the dissertation are commented, the limitations 
and problems of the survey and further research options.  
Altruistic behavior is one of the most consolidated methods in the literature on public 
good game experiments in explaining the deviation from free riding. Some papers show 
nonmonetary motivations in the behavior of subjects when they face a public good 
situation. Recently, various methodologies and procedures were applied for testing and 
estimating altruistic motivations of subjects. In general terms, most of the methodologies 
used consider that a part of the subjects of the experiments has altruistic motivations in 
their decision making. Nevertheless, few dissertations consider that altruistic behavior is 




In this dissertation, a survey has been accomplished with the aim of comparing two 
methodologies to estimate altruistic behavior in the context of the Public Good Games. 
The survey was made up for two Public Good Games. In the first one, subjects could 
change their allocation after observing the amount of contributions of the group. In the 
second game, subjects could punish the other members after observing each of their 
contributions. Then two procedures to estimate altruistic behavior were applied. The first 
one based on Kurzban and Houser (2005), it classifies subjects as altruist depending the 
result of an ordinary least-squares regression of each subject contribution on the average 
contribution that they viewed shortly before allocating their endowment. The second one, 
developed from a consideration in Alexander and Fotini (2011). It classifies subjects as 
altruist depending the personal expenditure undertaken by a subject for punishing other 
subjects. 
Results show that in this survey the percentage of subjects classified as altruist by the 
linear conditional-contribution profile methodology is higher than the percentage of 
subjects classified as altruist from Kurzban and Houser (2005). Subjects did not have a 
monetary incentive, for this reason, subjects probably acted more altruistically. 
Moreover, 55.13% of the subjects were classified as altruist by the linear conditional-
contribution profile and 64% of the subjects were classified as altruist by the personal cost 
undertaken by the punisher methodology. It seems clear that the second methodology is 
more permissive than the first one.  
Furthermore, most subjects considered as cooperators by the Brandts and Schram 
(2001) classification were classified as altruist by at least one methodology. It can be 
concluded that cooperators often have altruistic motivations in their behavior. 
Regarding gender, the percentage of women classified as altruist is a little higher than 
the percentage of men, but this difference is not statistically significant. Behavior of women 
is not more altruistic than behavior of men.  
Regarding the level of studies has an effect in how altruistic a subject is. People with 
postgraduate education presented percentages of subjects classified as altruist 




The survey has been a source of problems for study the altruistic behavior. First, there 
was not economic incentives for subjects, for this reason, probably subjects present a 
more altruistic behavior. Moreover, sample was not big enough. There were 78 answers, it 
is a small number for a complete study the altruism of subjects. The last problem was that 
ages of subjects were not heterogeneous enough, for this reason, the possibility of the age 
having an effect in how altruistic a subject is was not analyzed. 
Finally, some new alternatives of further research can be putting into action the 
methodologies used for this survey into a controlled experiment, with the aim of control the 
sample and using monetary incentives for motivate the decisions of the subjects. 
Moreover, another new alternative of research could be adding the methodology used in 
Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) with the objective to compare a new methodology with both 
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In this section, the elaboration of certain tests used in the Results section are presented. 
Tests of Normality 
Normality assumption is necessary for carrying out some estimators of statistical 
inference. In this section tests of normality for various samples are presented. 
Sample of men - Amounts that subjects are willing to give up for 
punish n = 55 
• Graphical analysis 
Figure 14 shows the frequency distribution of the sample of men and the amounts that 
they are willing to give up for punish and it does not look like similar to a normal 
distribution. Shapiro Wilk Test (from now on SW test) is the one applied to test the 
normality of the distribution. 
Figure 14: Frequency distribution of men and their amount spent for punish. 
 
• SW test 
H0. Sample of men comes from a normally distributed population. 
H1. Sample of men does not come from a normally distributed population. 
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Table  1: SW test for men distribution. 
N 55 
∑(X-‘X)2 13535.484 
Ain * dif -104.354 
SW c 0.805 
SW t 0.947 
P Value 0.00 
We can reject H0, sample does not come from a normally distributed population. 
Sample of women - Amounts that subjects are willing to give up for 
punish n = 23 
• Graphical analysis 
Figure 15 shows the frequency distribution of the sample of men and the amounts that 
they are willing to give up for punish and it does not look like similar to a normal 
distribution. SW test is the one applied to test the normality of the distribution. 
Figure 15: Frequency distribution of women and their amount spent for punish. 
 
• SW test 
H0. Sample of women comes from a normally distributed population. 
H1. Sample of women does not come from a normally distributed population. 
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Table  2: SW test for women distribution. 
N 23 
∑(X-‘X)2 5453.768 
Ain * dif -66.63 
SW c 0.814 
SW t 0.914 
P Value < 0.01 
We can reject H0, sample does not come from a normally distributed population. 
Sample of lower level of studies - Amounts that subjects are willing to 
give up for punish n = 72 
• Graphical analysis 
Figure 16 shows the frequency distribution of the sample of men and the amounts that 
they are willing to give up for punish and it does not look like similar to a normal 
distribution. SW test is the one applied to test the normality of the distribution. 
Figure 16: Frequency distribution of subjects with lower level of studies and their amount 
spent for punish. 
 
• SW test 
H0. Sample of lower level of studies comes from a normally distributed population. 
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H1. Sample of lower level of studies does not come from a normally distributed population. 
Table  3: SW test for subjects with lower level of studies distribution. 
N 72 
∑(X-‘X)2 16970.645 
Ain * dif -114.674 
SW c 0.775 
SW t 0.947 
P Value 0.000 
We can reject H0, sample does not come from a normally distributed population. 
Sample of higher level of studies - Amounts that subjects are willing to 
give up for punish n = 6 
• Graphical analysis 
Figure 17 shows the frequency distribution of the sample of men and the amounts that 
they are willing to give up for punish and it does not look like similar to a normal 
distribution. SW test is the one applied to test the normality of the distribution. 
Figure 17: Frequency distribution of subjects with higher level of studies and their amount 
spent for punish. 
 
• SW test 
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H0. Sample of higher level of studies comes from a normally distributed population. 
H1. Sample of higher level of studies does not come from a normally distributed population. 
Table  4: SW test for subjects with higher level of studies distribution. 
N 6 
∑(X-‘X)2 1881.88 
Ain * dif -32.59 
SW c 0.564 
SW t 0.788 
P Value 0.000 
We can reject H0, sample does not come from a normally distributed population. 
Mann Whitney U test 
In this section are presented the Mann-Whitney U tests used for comparing differences 
between male and female and differences between subjects with higher level of studies 
and subjects with lower level of studies. 
Differences in willingness to give up part of the endowment for 
punishing between men and women. 
H0. Me1 = Me2 There is no difference between men and women in the willingness to spend 
part of their endowment for punishing.  
H1. Me1 = Me2 Willingness to spend part of the endowment for punishing is different 
between men and women.  
Table  5: Mann Whitney U Test for the gender analysis. 
Sample N Sum of ranges  Z -0.411 
Men  55 R1  2135 P value 0.682 
Women 23 R2  946   
Total 78     
  U1 670   
  U2 595   




With a significant level of 0.05, we can not reject the H0. Thus, there is no difference 
between men and women in the willingness to spend part of their endowment for 
punishing. 
Differences in willingness to give up part of the endowment for 
punishing between subjects with higher level of studies and subjects 
with lower level of studies. 
H0. Me1 = Me2 There is no difference between subjects with higher level of studies and 
subjects with lower level of studies in the willingness to spend part of their endowment for 
punishing.  
H1. Me1 = Me2 Willingness to spend part of the endowment for punishing is different 
between subjects with higher level of studies and subjects with lower level of studies.  
Table  6: Mann Whitney U Test for the level of studies analysis. 
Sample N Sum of ranges  Z -2.044 
Subjects with lower level of 
studies 
72 R1  2917.5 
 
P value 0.041 
Subjects with higher level of 
studies 
6 R2  163.5 
 
  
Total 78     
  U1 107   
  U2 287   
  U [Min (U1, U2)] 107   
 
With a significant level of 0.05, we can reject the H0. Therefore, there is difference between 
subjects with higher level of studies and subjects with lower level of studies in the 




In this section the main screenshots of the survey are presented. Each game consists of 6 
rounds, but in this appendix are presented only 2 rounds of each game. Questionnaire is 
available on the following link: https://forms.gle/7SXnzitDcc2Ap1159. Values from each 
round depends on the decision of the first question, as it was commented in the section 
Survey Design. The screenshots presented here are showed when the subject choose 1 
for the first question. The survey is in Spanish.  
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